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F.2d at 512 (citations omitted). FERC's determination that its certification
of the incinerator was not a "major Federal action" was deemed reasonable
for several reasons. First, the "ministerial" nature of agency certification
deprived the agency of discretion in the matter and precluded the agency
from considering environmental factors. Id. at 513. Second, FERC had
insufficient control over the project to "federalize" it because the operator
of the incinerator could have constructed the facility without FERC certifi-
cation if it chose to give up the PURPA benefits, and because the agency
provided no federal funding "or other substantial federal assistance" to the
project. Id. at 513-14. Further, because "[t]he standard for triggering NHPA
requirements is similar to that for the triggering of NEPA requirements,"
id. at 515, the NHPA arguments failed as well.
II. ARBrrRATION, LABOR RELATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Written by PROFESSOR MARK H. GRUNEWALD
A. Federal Agencies-Duty to Bargain
In Social Security Administration v. Federal Labor Relations Authority,
956 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth Circuit held that the Federal
Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS), 5 U.S.C. sections
7101-7135, does not impose upon federal agencies a duty to bargain over
union proposals made during the term of a collective bargaining agreement.
The case arose, when during the term of its collective bargaining agreement
with the Social Security Administration (SSA), the American Federation of
Government Employees (AFGE) proposed the payment of relocation expenses
for employees who relocated as the result of promotion from within the
SSA, a subject on which the agreement was silent. The SSA refused to
bargain, and the AFGE filed an administrative complaint with the Federal
Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). The FLRA concluded that the SSA's
refusal to bargain constituted an unfair labor practice. On review, the court
ruled that while an FLRA decision was generally entitled to "considerable
deference," 956 F.2d at 1283, its examination of the language and design
of the statute as a whole made clear that the FLRA interpretation was
incorrect. The court acknowledged that the language of the statute did not
deal with the issue of mid-term union proposals, but found the statutory
language requiring the agency to bargain for the purpose of "arriving at a
collective bargaining agreement" suggested that post agreement bargaining
was not required. Id. at 1284 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(4) (1988)). The court
found confirmation for this view in the language of the statute that explicitly
required the Agency to bargain over the "impact and implementation" of
changes in employment it made mid-term. Id. The court also found support
for its conclusion in the legislative history of the statute and rejected a
contrary conclusion of the District of Columbia Circuit on the ground that
it had relied too heavily on private sector labor law precedent which requires
such bargaining. Finally, the court expressed the view that to conclude that
the FSLMRS duty to bargain extended to union-initiated mid-term proposals
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would jeopardize the overriding goal of the statute to protect the 'para-
mount right of the public to as effective and efficient a Government as
possible."' Id. at 1288 (quoting H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1717, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 154 (1978), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE, TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
REFORM ACT OF 1978 793, 822 (Comm. Print 1979)).
B. Preemption
In Richardson v. Kruchko & Fries, 966 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1992), the
Fourth Circuit held that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29
U.S.C. sections 151-187, preempts a tort action by a former employee against
the legal counsel of her former employer for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress or intentional interference with business relations. The plaintiff
alleged that the law firm advised her employer to discharge her for union
activity. The court viewed the former employee's claims an "artfully pleaded,"
966 F.2d 158, attempt to avoid the general preemption standard of the
NLRA which precludes state regulation of conduct "'actually or arguably'
protected ... or 'prohibited' by federal statute. Id. at 156 (citations
omitted). The Fourth Circuit reasoned that to address either of the former
employee's tort claims, a court would have to determine whether her dis-
charge was an "unfair labor practice" under the NLRA-a question reserved
by the preemption doctrine to the National Labor Relations Board to avoid
the risk of undermining national policy through inconsistent state-law judg-
ments. Id. at 158. The court recognized that under its ruling the plaintiff
would be limited to the process and remedies of the NLRA as against her
former employer and would not be able to attack the allegedly tortious
conduct of the law firm. The court nevertheless concluded that to depart
from the preemption doctrine when a plaintiff sought to use state law against
a defendant who could not be reached under the NLRA would create an
intolerably large exception that could disrupt important relationships such
as, in this case, the attorney-client relationship. Accordingly, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint.
C. Fair Labor Standards Act-Overtime
In Wilson v. City of Charlotte, 964 F.2d 1391 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc),
the Fourth Circuit held by a vote of 7-6 that in a state that prohibits
collective bargaining by governmental units with their employees, a union of
public employees is not the "representative" of the employees for the
purposes of section 7(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA),
29 U.S.C. section 207(o). Section 7(o) requires cash payment rather than
compensatory time off for overtime hours unless an agreement to the contrary
is reached between the public employer and the "representative" of its
employees. Under the court's view, the city fire fighters had no "represen-
tative" and thus section 7(o), as interpreted in Department of Labor regu-
lations, 29 C.F.R. section. 553.23(a)(1), permitted the public employer to
continue unilaterally a practice of compensatory time off in lieu of cash
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payment. While the majority viewed its construction of 7(o) as necessary to
avoid conflict with state law with respect to public employee collective
bargaining, the dissent saw the role of the representative under 7(o) as simply
the employee representative for arriving at an "agreement," 964 F.2d at
1401, but not a "collective bargaining agreement," Id. at 1402, with the
employer as to which of two regulatory standards-time 'off or cash pay-
ment-would apply. The choice offered by the statute was part of a legislative
compromise after the FLSA was applied again to state and local governmental
employers when the Supreme Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruled its 1972 decision in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which had found
application of the FLSA to state and local governments unconstitutional.
The Fourth Circuit's decision has the effect of limiting employee participation
in the choice between the two forms of compensation under the federal
wage-hour law in states which restrict public employee collective bargaining-
a subject not directly related to the purposes of the FLSA.
D. Age Discrimination in Employment-EEOC Investigative Authority
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. American & Efird
Mills, Inc., 964 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam), the Fourth Circuit
held that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has
statutory authority to investigate possible discrimination under Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) section 7(a), 29 U.S.C. section
626(a), even where the individual charge triggering the investigation is time
barred. A former employee of American & Efird filed a charge with the
EEOC, claiming that the company had discharged him nineteen months
earlier because of his age. Under the ADEA, an individual charge of
discrimination must be filed with the EEOC within six months of the alleged
discriminatory act. The EEOC notified the company of the charge and
requested information about the company's general employment practices
and policies and about the circumstances of the former employee's discharge.
The company refused to provide any of the information on the ground that
the individual charge was time barred. After further efforts to obtain the
information failed, the EEOC issued an administrative subpoena against the
company and ultimately brought an action in federal district court to have
its subpoena enforced.
Relying on EEOC v. Ocean City Police Department, 820 F.2d 1378 (4th
Cir. 1987) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 1019 (1988), which
dealt with investigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
district court refused to enforce the EEOC subpoena, reasoning that the
EEOC had no authority to investigate a time barred age discrimination
charge. 964 F.2d at 304. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court decision
and remanded the case, ruling that the general investigatory authority granted
to the EEOC in section 7(a) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. section 626(a), includes
the power to investigate age discrimination in employment independent of
individual charges. The court distinguished this authority from the investi-
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gatory authority of the EEOC in the cases of race and sex discrimination
under Title VII where the power to investigate is ordinarily dependent upon
the filing of a timely individual charge.
III. BANKRUPTCY
Written by
RIcHARD L. WASSERMAN, ESQ. AND MmmiAm J. SCtMELL, ESQ.
A. Classification of Claims and "Cramdown"
In In re Bryson Properties, XVIII, 961 F.2d 496 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 191 (1992), the Fourth Circuit dealt with a Chapter 11 debtor's
plan of reorganization that provided, among other things, for the separate
classification of a nonrecourse mortgagee's deficiency claim from other
unsecured creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (1988) (dealing with Chapter
1l's allowance of nonrecourse mortgagee's deficiency claims). In addition,
the plan also allowed the debtor's limited partners to retain their interests
in the partnership in exchange for cash contributions to the debtor. The
bankruptcy court and the district court approved the plan. In reversing, the
Fourth Circuit held that the separate classification of the nonrecourse mort-
gagee's deficiency claim in a case where all unsecured claims would receive
the same distribution treatment under the plan was for the purpose of
manipulating the voting on the plan and, therefore, impermissible.
The Fourth Circuit then addressed the issue of the absolute priority rule
and the "new capital exception." 961 F.2d at 503. While not deciding
whether the new value exception survived under the Bankruptcy Code, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that it would not apply in this case. The debtor's
limited partners' exclusive right to contribute new capital, which in effect
allowed them to purchase the property without the risk of outside potential
buyers, constitutes "property" under 11 U.S.C. section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) that
was received or retained on account of a prior interest. 961 F.2d at 504-05.
The proposed reorganization plan, which in this case provided the debtor's
limited partners with the exclusive right to contribute and recover new capital
prior to the first mortgagee's recovery of its unsecured claim, was not "fair
and equitable" where the first mortgagee was the only truly impaired creditor.
Id. at 505.
B. Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences
In In re Jeffrey Bigelow Design Group, Inc., 956 F.2d 479 (4th Cir.
1992), a third party purchased fifty percent of the stock in the debtor in
exchange for a cash payment and the arrangement with a bank for a line
of credit for the benefit of the debtor. Although the third party was the
maker of the line of credit, only the debtor received the draws and all
payments were made directly by the debtor to the bank. After the debtor
filed its bankruptcy petition, the Chapter 7 trustee filed a complaint to
recover payments from the debtor to the bank as fraudulent conveyances
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